Drawdown and Reset of Equipment in Iraq - Operation Clean Sweep

摘要

We evaluated DOD's plans for Operation Clean Sweep to determine whether roles, responsibilities, and lines of reporting were well defined and documented; the plans comprehensively addressed equipment accountability, visibility, and disposition; and whether realistic milestones were established. We also determined whether Operation Clean Sweep was effectively implemented in accordance with those plans. Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1022, 'Operation Clean Sweep,' October 26, 2009, defines the roles, responsibilities, and procedures necessary for processing excess equipment in support of the Iraq drawdown. According to documents provided by the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) (ESC), the Mobile Redistribution Teams (MRT) processed and re-established accountability for about $768 million of excess equipment from October 2009 to April 10, 2010. We commend the 13th ESC and the MRTs for those results. However, not all units supported the MRT mission, limiting the effectiveness of Operation Clean Sweep. During our site visits to four Forward Operating Bases, we identified units that denied the MRTs access to their excess equipment, did not comply with FRAGO requirements to sort their excess equipment before the MRT's arrival, and did not provide adequate logistical support to the MRTs. This occurred because FRAGO 1022 did not require mandatory participation in Operation Clean Sweep and the MRT's mission and goals were not communicated to all units and commanders. During our audit, U.S. Forces-Iraq and 13th ESC issued two FRAGOs which addressed our communication concerns; however, neither required mandatory participation in Operation Clean Sweep. Mandatory participation is key to Operation Clean Sweep effectiveness.