Sensor Irony: How Reliance on Sensor Technology is Limiting Our View of the Battlefield

摘要

This study shows that Department of Defense (DOD) overdependence on air and space-based sensor technologies reduces the surveillance and reconnaissance (S&R) capability of the operational-level commander and sets the conditions for initial failure on the future battlefield. An analysis of DOD capability priorities from 1950 to present shows a steady increase in reliance on technological solutions coupled with reduced manpower. Within his vision of department-wide transformation, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave new impetus to this technological focus. Transformation, more than just improving capabilities, fundamentally changed how DOD viewed the conduct of war. Analysis shows that transformation was not necessarily a bad concept, but was flawed in its extreme interpretations and subsequent execution. Analyzing the capabilities and limitations of DOD's current and predicted S&R force reveals a wide disparity between ground and air/space-based systems. Further assessing these systems against battlefield constraints reveals an S&R force structure that, while functional in a permissive environment, will not perform as advertised against plausible future threat scenarios. Many potential adversaries currently possess the ability to negate U.S. S&R capabilities. While it is never too late to fix a problem, DOD must first acknowledge that a problem exists. Ground S&R assets, particularly at the Army Corps/Marine Expeditionary Force, and Army Division/Marine Expeditionary Brigade level, must return to time tested and historically justified capabilities if the U.S. is to avoid future mission failure or unnecessary loss of life and treasure.