Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment of DOD's Funding Projection for the F136 Alternate Engine

摘要

The $2.9 billion funding projection cited by DOD as the additional funding required to support an alternate engine program was intended to provide a general sense of the funding needed. As such, the projection does not include the same level of fidelity and precision normally associated with a detailed, comprehensive estimate. DOD analysts relied largely on data, assumptions, and methodologies from an analysis done 3 years ago and have characterized the $2.9 billion projection as having an equal chance of being too high or too low. Therefore, this projection should be viewed as one point within a range of possible costs depending on the factors and assumptions used, and not as an absolute amount. Different assumptions and more detailed information could either increase or decrease the $2.9 billion funding projection. That said, we found two key assumptions made by DOD in developing the $2.9 billion funding projection that have a significant impact on the estimated amount of up front investment needed. These assumptions were (1) 4 years of noncompetitive procurements of both engines would be needed to allow the alternate engine contractor sufficient time to gain production experience and complete developmental qualification of the engine, and (2) the government would need to fund quality and reliability improvements for engine components. Past studies and historical data we examined indicate that it may take less than 4 years of noncompetitive procurements and that competition may obviate the need for the government to fund component improvement programs. If these conditions hold true for the alternate engine, the funding projection for the alternate engine could be lower than DOD's projection.