Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: Strategy and Institutional Friction

摘要

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the primary vehicle of U.S. counterterrorism policy in North Africa. Established in 2005, the TSCTP is a multiyear, multiagency effort to support diplomacy, development, and military activities aimed at inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology in nine countries. Led by the Department of State s Africa Bureau, key participating agencies include the Department of State (DOS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DoD). A 2008 GAO report noted that a weakness of the TSCTP was that it lacked a comprehensive, integrated strategy. The paper examines the threat, the evolution of strategy from 2002 to 2010, and the institutional friction that developed during implementation. Five conclusions are gleaned from TSCTP that apply to Irregular Warfare when an embassy is used as a platform during a whole- of-government effort.