Sons of Iraq Program: Results Are Uncertain and Financial Controls Were Weak

摘要

In September 2006, enemy-initiated attacks in Iraq had reached some of the highest levels since the U.S. invasion in March 2003. These attacks, initiated primarily by members of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), were against both Iraqi citizens and Coalition Forces. At the same time, Coalition Forces found that citizens in Anbar Province were reacting very strongly against the violence. Hoping to take advantage of the backlash, Coalition Forces met with groups and tribes, some of whom previously worked with AQI to convince them to work as allies against AQI. Ultimately this dialog led to a program called the Sons of Iraq (SOI). In June 2007 the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) began using Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to hire passive supporters and former insurgents to guard checkpoints, buildings, and key parts of neighborhoods. The SOI program, in combination with other events, most notably the 2007 surge of U.S. forces into Iraq, has been credited with helping reduce the overall levels of violence. During the course of the program, MNC-I spent approximately $370 million of fiscal year 2007 through 2009 CERP funds. Past SIGIR reports have identified weaknesses in the management of CERP funds, and SIGIR investigators have conducted numerous criminal investigations of individual misconduct related to CERP-funded activities. In one example, in December 2009, a U.S. Army Captain pled guilty to stealing approximately $690, 000, primarily SOI funds. Given the large amount of funding, the previously reported management weaknesses, the burgeoning CERP-related criminal cases, and the risk associated with giving large amounts of funds to former insurgents, SIGIR initiated a review of the SOI program.