Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions About Prediction and National Security

摘要

The U.S. military relies on prediction to forecast needs and influence the design of major equipment. A future or futures are envisioned, requirements are deduced, and acquisition and design decisions are made and justified accordingly. However, both the experience of the Department of Defense (DoD) and social science literature demonstrate that long-term predictions are consistently mistaken. The acceleration, proliferation, and diversification of technical and political changes make 21st-century security risks even more unpredictable than those of the past. Thus, whereas some efforts to predict the future are necessary and predictive techniques can be improved, acquisition programs should reflect the likelihood of predictive failure. The defense community should prepare to be unprepared. This report presents 10 propositions regarding prediction. The first five are descriptive: (1) The propensity to make predictions -- and to act on the basis of predictions -- is inherently human; (2) Requirements for prediction will consistently exceed the ability to predict; (3) The propensity for prediction is deeply embedded at the highest levels of DoD; (4) The unpredictability of long-term national security challenges is an immovable object; and (5) Planning across a range of scenarios is good practice but will not prevent predictive failure. The second group of propositions are prescriptive. They show how policymakers can better design processes, programs, and equipment to account for the likelihood of predictive failure. Doing so will involve several actions: (6) Accelerating decision tempo and delaying some decisions, (7) Increasing the agility of our production processes, (8) Prioritizing adaptability, (9) Building more for the short term, and (10) Nurturing diversity and creating competition.