Contending Concepts Tactics and Operational Art. Volume I

摘要

This study attempts to isolate tactical doctrine as it contributes to the battlefield performance of the U.S. 'heavy' division. Using a systems approach, the study evaluates identical divisions as they operate in the 1986 European battlefield environment against a Warsaw Pact force. The variable within each system is the tactical doctrine used by the division. Two tactical doctrines are tested. The first, the 'base case,' is the current doctrine out of 'How to Fight' series of Field Manuals, most particularly FM100-5 Operations and FM7-1000 Armored and Mechanized Division Operations. The second, the 'alternative,' is called 'Mobile Operations' and represents the study group's synthesis of some of the best operational features of U.S., USSR, Israeli and German doctrines and their antecedents.