MacArthur's Lapses from an Envelopment Strategy in 1945

摘要

The strategy which General of the Army Douglas MacArthur adopted in 1945 in the southwest Pacific campaign has received scant attention from historians. Symbolic of this neglect is the omission in the American Army's series on the Pacific conflict of a sequel to Louis Morton's Strategy and Command: The Fist Two Years, whose coverage ends in late 1943. The treatment of MacArthur's late-war strategy in most college-level textbooks on recent American or military history ranges form no mention whatsoever to propagation of a host of myths. This essay challenges three of those myths still widely believed: 1. That after the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally authorized an invasion of Luzon, the directive was subsequently implemented by MacArthur in the manner envisioned by his superiors; 2. that having gained credit, often justifiable, for brilliant moves bypassing strong Japanese forces, MacArthur continued to the war's en his policy of bypassing and thus neutralizing the enemy forces in his theater's rear areas, rather than attacking them; and 3. that during the final weeks preceding Japan's capitulation, the next major invasion that MacArthur had in mind was Operation Olympic, the landing on Japan's southernmost island, Kyushu, which was set for November 1945.