Accountability of Night Vision Devices Procured for the Afghan National Security Forces Needs Improvement.

摘要

We reviewed DoD, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and contractor accountability for 7,157 night vision devices (NVDs) and associated spare tubes procured for the ANSF. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officials, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) officials, ANSF officials, and DoD contractors did not maintain complete accountability for NVDs and associated spare tubes procured for the ANSF. Specifically, we identified that 342 NVD serial numbers were missing from the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) and 88 NVD serial numbers were missing from the Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database (OVERLORD) during our shipping document reconciliations; 113 NVD serial numbers were missing from SCIP and 40 NVD serial numbers were missing from OVERLORD in our SCIP and OVERLORD comparisons; 75 NVDs were unaccounted for during our physical inventory; and 397 discrepancies existed in the contractor's database and 518 discrepancies across four units' property books during our accountable record reconciliations. This occurred because DSCA officials did not provide adequate oversight to verify that U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials properly implemented procedures; NTM-A/CSTC-A officials did not always reconcile the NVDs received to the shipping documents, use SCIP for NVD accountability, perform complete physical inventories, and provide adequate oversight of DoD contractors and ANSF officials; and CECOM officials did not provide adequate oversight of DoD contractors. As a result, NVDs and associated spare tubes are more vulnerable to theft or loss, officials cannot rely on the data as a tool to determine NVD requirements, and officials cannot perform effective end-use monitoring.