German Counter-C3 Activity and Its Effects on Soviet Command, Control, and Communications During Operation Barbarossa

摘要

This study was conducted to examine German planning for Operation Barbarossa and German execution of that operation from 22 June to 31 July 1941 to determine the planning and execution of counter-C3 activities and the effects of those activities on Soviet command, control, and communications. Research was restricted to English language sources and included interviews with Soviet and German participants of the Eastern Front, two trips to the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania and the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, and a trip to the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The results of this study indicate no counter-C3 doctrine on the part of the Germans, and no concerted counter-C3 plan to disrupt Soviet C3 during Operation Barbarossa. This study does indicate a dramatic disruption of Soviet C3 during the opening stages of Operation Barbarossa. (Author)