Beyond the Battlefield: Institutional Army Transformation Following Victory in Iraq.

摘要

The American military s mission in Iraq required the Army at large and units and Soldiers across the force to apply a variety of creative problem- solving skills and resourcefulness as the Army adapted to the harsh conditions of a counterinsurgency campaign in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Out of the necessity to adapt in order to defeat the insurgents in Iraq, our Army evolved continuously on the battlefield, effecting radical changes in doctrine, organizations, training, and materiel, while achieving a synergistic effect greatly enabling our success. Scanning to determine the Army s proper role as part of the future force has been a popular subject of discussion among think tanks, military strategists, and pundits in recent months. The author outlines several of the popular schools of thought and articulates cogent arguments as to why the Army of the future must be prepared to fight our nation s wars across the entire spectrum of conflict. As we look to the role the Army will play in the future, it is essential that we look back to that adaptation in the sands of Iraq to determine what contributed to the successful conclusion of our mission there. American military history is fraught with examples of failing to apply the lessons of the previous fight to guide adaptation of the institutional Army so that the hard earned lessons of the past war are applied to minimize future costs in terms of men and materiel. Especially as the Army faces significant budgetary cuts in light of the fiscal austerity of the present, it is vital that we analyze the success of efforts to defeat the insurgents in Iraq utilizing all of the instruments of national power; and to make recommendations for competencies capabilities necessary in the institutional Army along the problem-solving construct of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities.