Command and Control of U.S. Army Amphibious Operations: An Essential Element of Projecting Combat Power

摘要

This study investigates the hypothesis that command and control functions have a vital impact on the success or failure of amphibious operations. Based on this hypothesis, this study analyzes the amphibious assault landings conducted during Operation TORCH (November 1942, North Africa) and Operation CHROMITE (September 1950, Inchon Landing) to examine how command and control functions of U.S. Army/Marine Corps ship-to-shore amphibious operations have evolved since World War II, how adequate they are today and what are the implications for the future. The Wass de Czege Combat Power Model is used in this study to provide an analytical framework for understanding the components of combat power and highlights span of control, standard operating procedures and doctrine, unit/staff efficiency, and adequate communications as the critical functions that form the basis for efficient command and control. The study concludes that the existing amphibious doctrine requires revision. It argues that there is an over-reliance on radios to control the ship-to-shore movement of amphibious assault landings which reduces the need to clearly understand the commander's intent. Additionally, the doctrine ignores the importance of the human dimension to the ultimate success of amphibious assault landings.