Historical Argument for a Force in Readiness.

摘要

The United States Marine Corps' most recent operating concept, 2010, directs the organization toward preparing for what it believes to be the most likely future conflict. The Corps has decided to focus on irregular wars as a priority for preparing for combat. This focus diverges from previous Marine Corps concepts because the organization has previously strived to remain a balanced general purpose force in readiness. This argument is important because it challenges the idea that deviating from what has proved successful to the Corps for the past one hundred years will balance the Corps, but conversely imbalance the force. This monograph used a historical comparison of the Marine Corps' and U.S. Army's preparation for war from 1912 to 2012 and concluded that throughout this period the Marine Corps' stance as a general purpose force in readiness has proven its worth to the Republic. This conclusion is evidenced by the Corps' preparation through three distinct periods: 1912-1945, 1946-1991, and 1992-2012.