Yesterday's Doctrine for Today's Contingencies: The Small Wars Manual and the Security Assistance Force in Low Intensity Conflict

摘要

The purpose of this monograph is to evaluate the doctrinal concepts underlying the U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual and the U.S. Army's Security Assistance Force (SAF), determining whether they are applicable today against to a Maoist-led insurgency. In other words, does the doctrine formulated in the Manual and SAF over 50 and 20 years ago, respectively, have any utility in future Low Intensity Conflicts. In addition, the study questions whether these earlier doctrinal concepts, which attempted to isolate the insurgent through political, economic and social action, are more relevant than purely tactical military responses. The study begins with a brief overview of the political realities influencing U.S. responses in the Third World. Next, the monograph explores the historical development, purpose and doctrinal concepts pertaining to the Manual and the SAF. The study finds these doctrines similar in several areas: 1) they recognize the protracted nature of a counter-insurgency; 2) they first attempt through non-military means to isolate the insurgent by gaining the population's allegiance; 3) they understand the importance of tactical intelligence; and 4) they advocate the use of the propaganda to achieve their ends. Then, these doctrinal concepts are compared with those contained in Mao Tse Tung's writings. (kr)