Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea.

摘要

China has described the South China Sea as its sovereign territory, where it has the right to intervene economically and militarily. The United States has described the South China Sea as a global commons, where freedom of navigation and the rule of law are in its national interests. These two worldviews currently coexist in an unstable peace in which each side claims its own version of international law should apply, and occasionally, goes to arms to defend it. All of the claimants to the South China Sea are willing to use force if necessary to implement their policies, yet no nation knows how far the other is willing to go. The result is a chess match of gunboat diplomacy: the maritime show of force that aims to influence the policy makers in the targeted nation. This thesis will analyze the conflict over the South China Sea on the legal, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The purpose of the thesis is to examine Chinese and U.S. policy in the South China Sea and determine if and where conflict could arise, and how it could be avoided. Chapter One is a short introduction to the South China Sea's geography, economic profile, strategic importance, and other characteristics. Chapter Two examines the dispute at the legal level concerning the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the political rhetoric about its implementation. Chapter Three examines China's military forces, their strategic doctrine, and how that strategy manifests itself in the South China Sea. Chapter Four details the same, but concerning Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Chapter Five examines U.S. policy in the South China Sea, current force structure in the Western Pacific, strategy, and a look into the future of possible conflict scenarios.