Insurgent Movement in Ukraine during 1940s-1950s: Lessons Learned from the Case Study of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA).

摘要

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) through the years 1942 to 1953. That armed liberation force was established during the first years of WWII in the Western Ukrainian territories by nationalists whose purpose was obtaining independence for Ukraine by armed revolution. After failing to gain independence for Ukraine after WWI, different Ukrainian political parties, primarily in Western Ukraine, directed their activities toward reestablishing a sovereign and independent Ukraine. One of these political parties, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929, consolidated the most fervent nationalist cadres and became the principal organization of the liberation movement. After the German-Soviet war started, the most radical OUN wing decided to wage an uncompromising war on 'two fronts': against Nazi Germany and against Communist Soviet Union. The OUN became the pillar for forming the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1942. The Ukrainian insurgency resisted the occupational regimes for about 14 years, but was ultimately defeated by the Soviet authorities in the mid-1950s. This research discusses the nature of the Ukrainian insurgency, the aspects of the insurgency that were considered effective, and the reasons why it ultimately succumbed to defeat. By analyzing the effectiveness of the UPA, the author discovered what insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures could be effectively applied to current Ukrainian military doctrine on unconventional warfare. Ukrainian military and law enforcement institutions should examine the lessons learned from the Ukrainian insurgency, particularly with respect to the OUN-UPA, for the purpose of understanding the causes of insurgency, developing effective mechanisms for preventing an insurgency, and establishing effective techniques for conducting a counterinsurgency.