US Strategic Nuclear Strategy and Forces: A Roadmap for the Year 2000

摘要

Deterrence of nuclear war is a fundamental goal of the United States, for ifdeterrence fails, the existence of the nation could be in jeopardy. Deterrence has been maintained since the end of World War II because the nuclear powers have not, for whatever reason, felt it in their interest to initiate such hostilities. In the intervening years, an arms race has ensued which has produced increasingly powerful nuclear arsenals at increasingly greater cost. This study recounts that nuclear arms race, both in terms of nuclear strategy and strategic force structure. From this beginning, the study goes on to postulate what nuclear deterrence might look like in the year 2000. Assuming that US strategy and force structure are derived from the perceived Soviet threat, the study presents three different cases based upon three different future Soviet Unions. In the first two cases, an improved US/Soviet relationship is considered. In the third case, a more threatening Soviet Union provides the basis for US nuclear strategy and force structure. The study concludes with some general observations and comments concerning the three cases and where the author believes the US should be headed in the strategic nuclear area between the years 1990-2000.