Counterinsurgency: What Are the Key Lessons Learned from the Success and Failure of Western World Involvement Since World War 2.

摘要

As the Soviet threat decreases and regional contingencies focus on Mid to Low Intensity Conflict, greater emphasis must be placed upon conducting counterinsurgency operations. This study identifies military planning advice regarding united States involvement in future large scale counterinsurgency operations. An analysis is conducted of four different Post World War II counterinsurgency case studies to derive a set of six lessons or principles which planners may apply to future operations. Each lesson is based upon historical analysis and is reinforced by key actions which relate directly to the successful execution of counterinsurgency. The case studies reflect successful (British in Malaya and the Philippine Insurrection) and failed attempts (French in Indochina/Algeria and the U.S. in Vietnam) at large scale counterinsurgency which provide a common base for the development of this study. This study accounts for the Western World approach to counterinsurgency and ascertains that: although U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is acceptable, efforts to develop an appropriate strategy and operational approach to planning are inadequate.