Armaments Coproduction at a Crossroads. U.S. Policy Options After the Cold War

摘要

The changes wrought by the end of the Cold War and the increasing globalizationof defense technology are compelling reasons to reexamine U.S. policy on the coproduction or licensed production of U.S.-designed weapon systems by allied and friendly nations. During the Cold War era, U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives justified the transfer of technical data and manufacturing know-how to U.S. allies to enable their production of U.S.-designed weapon systems in meeting their legitimate defense needs. In today's world, with national security defined both in politico-military and economic terms, the long-term commercial interests of U.S. defense industry can no longer be ignored in such technology transfer decisions. We advocate the institution of a systematic risk assessment methodology in the Government's review of coproduction or production licensing agreements to reduce or avoid potential adverse impacts on the U.S. defense industrial base. We also argue the case in favor of a policy shift from one-way defense technology transfers toward a more cooperative form of arms collaboration based on equitable balance between inbound and outbound technology transfers. Coproduction, Licensed production, Export controls, Defense industrial base, Technology transfer, Security assistance, Arms collaboration.