Postwar Army and the Loss of Operational Art: Could It Happen Again

摘要

This monograph examines the U.S. Army's initial loss of operational art after itsemergence during the American Civil War and the subsequent erosion of operational art in the post-World War II era. As a warfighting paradigm, the Army's peacetime embodiment of operational art is directly related to the Army's ability to win in future conflicts. In examining the research question, this study begins by examining some of operational art's essential components. These components serve as a set of measurement criteria to illustrate the Army's loss, acceptance, and erosion of operational art between the Civil War and the Korean War. A theoretical model, which explains how thought processes change within professional communities, provides an understanding of the institutional aspects concerning the development of operational art as a warfighting methodology. Operational art, Peacetime army, U.S. Army, Institutional development, Military history, General staff.