Quick, Decisive Victory: Defining Maxim or Illusory Concept within Army Doctrine.

摘要

With the approval of the Army's preliminary draft of its keystone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations, the terms quick, decisive victory is now an integral part of doctrinal lexicon. The introduction of this important phrase indicates the Army's principle focus in the prosecution of future military operations. This paper examines the historical concept of a decisive battle and relates it to the notion of a decisive campaign that produces decisive victory. This study addresses the question: Is quick, decisive victory a useful maxim for the Army or an illusory concept that reflects political exigencies rather than military realities. To provide a basis for analysis. this monograph is organized in the following three major sections. The first section provides a nineteenth century backdrop to the evolution of the concept of decisive victory. It examines the preeminent decisive battle of the Napoleonic era, Austerlitz, and the related theories of Carl Von Clausewitz and Hans Delbruk. The second section traces the American military's search for decisive victory in the following four conflicts: the Civil War, World War II, Vietnam and the Gulf War. The third section examines the contemporary basis for the inclusion of decisive victory in the Army's keystone doctrinal manual FM 100-5, Operations. A discussion of the Weinberger Doctrine provides a critical link from the Vietnam experience to present day doctrine. A development of the concept of conflict termination helps define the parameters of winning and ultimate victory.