Stabilization Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone.

摘要

This thesis examines the near failure and ultimate success of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. This operation is an interesting case study as it followed failed attempts at regional peacekeeping, in many ways mirrored them, but ultimately ended the conflict. This was the last operation the UN started before the Brahimi report and was effectively a tipping point for UN operations in general. This research analyzes the strategy and actions of the UN force as the situation progressively deteriorated to near total failure and the changes made to both that led to the dramatic turnaround in a short period of time. The overall strategy of the UN mission, mandates and their interpretation, troop levels, and responses to threats are considered. The shift from a peacekeeping to peace enforcement strategy and the simultaneous shift in tactics to favor aggressive response to threats earned the credibility necessary to deter aggression. This underscores the need to tailor strategy and mandate to the specific conditions on the ground and to allow the force the flexibility to adapt quickly.