Finding the Right Mix of Military and Civil Airlift, Issues and ImplicationsVolume 3. Appendixes

摘要

To expand its authority to activate the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) withoutrequiring action by the President (which is needed for Stage III), the Defense Department has increased the size of Stages I and II. For example, Stage I for passenger aircraft is 63 percent larger. Stage II for cargo aircraft is 100 percent larger. DoD's continuing revisions to the CRAF program are more broadly linking government business to participation in the CRAF. Estimated costs for completing the C-17 program have risen, the schedule has been stretched, and for long distances, the airplane's payload has been reduced. A congressionally mandated Cost and Operational Effectiveness Assessment for the C-17 was completed by the Institute for Defense Analyses in 1993. *DoD's continuing assessment of airlift requirements is showing increased needs for airlift during the early weeks of a major regional contingency and even greater needs during the early weeks of a second nearly simultaneous major regional contingency. The perspectives of the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands on the need for capacity and flexibility in the airlift fleet are reflected in the outcome of their August 1993 meeting, in which they expressed a very strong desire for a new military-style transport with flexibility like that possessed by