Influence of Technology on the Theory of Warfare: Clausewitz Revises 'On War' After the Battle of Britain.

摘要

According to Carl von Clausewitz, '...in modern war one will search in vain for a battle in which the winning side triumphed over an army twice its size.' Yet, throughout the summer and early fall of 1940, the Royal Air Force (RAF) fought the Battle of Britain against a German Luftwaffe that enjoyed at least a 4-to-1 numerical advantage. The bravery of the RAF pilots notwithstanding, the battle was decided in favor of the British by technological innovations that evened the odds. Did the technological revolution that followed Clausewitz's death in 1830 render his book 'On War' obsolete. Or had he anticipated the future when he said '...what it usually comes down to is that one side invents improvements and first puts them to use, and the other side simply copies them,' thereby validating his theory against time and change. Citing the exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum during the Battle of Britain, this paper examines the impact of technology on Clausewitz's theory of warfare. It specifically examines how the use of radar, signals intelligence, and electronic countermeasures affect his concepts of numerical superiority, relative strength, and night operations. To systematically examine each area, the author will discuss a thesis (Clausewitzian concept), antithesis (technological innovation), and synthesis (Clausewitz's rewrite). That synthesis is then projected onto tomorrow's electronic battlefield.