The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has been responsible for more deaths and injuries than any other weapons system in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite a $58 billion dollar investment in C-IED capability, the Department of Defense has been unable to prevent this weapon from achieving devastating effects on military and civilian targets and threatening national objectives. Within the Army, continued organizational refinements to fighting formations combined with formalization of specific capabilities will better prepare Army units for operations in high intensity IED environments. Specifically, the creation of an organic Brigade Combat Team Counter-IED Fusion Cell, sufficiently manned and singularly responsible for the integration and synchronization of all Counter-IED (C-IED) initiatives, will significantly improve targeting activities within the BCT and enable a more offensive posture when confronted with active IED threats. The IED environment has proven too complex and too lethal not to have a sufficiently manned and dedicated staff element assigned primary responsibility for integrating C-IED information and synchronizing C-IED activities. The U.S. Army's experience with the IED in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the associated institutional response, demonstrate how unprepared the DOD was for the tactical and strategic impact of the IED. This analysis highlights how the defense establishment transformed from an organization which was unprepared for the emergence of this asymmetric threat to an institution rapidly and aggressively seeking ways to mitigate IED effectiveness.
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