Armor Attacks in Restrictive Terrain: Is Current U.S. Army Doctrine Adequate

摘要

This monograph seeks to determine the adequacy of current U.S. Army doctrine asit pertains to the planning and execution of attacks by an armored force in restrictive terrain. Many circumstances and possible threats will require the use of a mounted force in offensive operations in less than favorable terrain. Therefore, it is important to assess pertinent doctrine. The monograph begins with a discussion of restrictive terrain as defined in doctrinal publications. The paper then evaluates doctrine concerning offensive armor operations in restrictive terrain. Following the doctrinal review, three historical examples related to armor attacks in restrictive terrain are examined: Kampfgruppe Peiper's attack through the Ardennes in 1944, Task Force Crombez' attack to linkup with encircled forces at Chip'yong-ni in Korea in 1951, and Operation Lam Son 719 in Vietnam and Laos in 1971. The study then develops key considerations from the historical examples. The key considerations become the standard by which doctrine is measured. The monograph concludes that current U.S. Army doctrine is inadequate because it does not effectively address planning and executing armor attacks in restrictive terrain.