The IEC/N-IEC Distinction and Changing Moral Attitudes

摘要

In "Thinking Ahead on Deep Brain Stimulation: An Analysis of the Ethical Implications of a Developing Technology" Veronica Johansson and colleagues (2014) state that their main objective is to "illuminate the contextual dependence and transience" of bioethically relevant features—"bioethical concerns"—of a developing technology, deep brain stimulation (DBS). Here I argue there are two substantial problems with their analysis. First, in an effort to determine whether a feature of DBS is morally relevant, the authors draw a distinction between inherent ethical concerns (IEC) and noninherent ethical concerns (N-IEC). I show that this distinction is specious and irrelevant to discerning either the current or future morally relevant features of a technology. Second, the authors contend that bioethical concerns are dependent upon our changing moral attitudes. I argue that what attitudes one expresses is irrelevant to discerning the bioethically relevant features of a technology.