Neuroethics: Some Things Old, Some Things New, Some Things Borrowed... and To Do

摘要

Dubljevi? and Racine (2014) rightly take issue with simplistic ascription of particular neural bases to specific types of moral codification (e.g., aretaics, deontology, etc.). In support of the authors' contention, it is important to note that like other forms of judgments and resulting behaviors, moral decisions and actions involve perceptions and memories of reward and punishment generated in contexts of environments and relations to others, and anticipation of and response to reinforcing emotions of pleasure, discomfort, and pain (for review, see Verplaetse et al. 2009). Pro Dubljevi? and Racine, we believe that more accurately defining moral thought and behavior will entail building upon extant understanding of cognition, so as to (best) frame new ideas-such as the models for moral psychology offered by the authors-to both comport well with extant neuroscientific information, and give rise to new approaches and constructs of neuroethics.