The Metaphysical Assumptions Required for Political Autonomy

摘要

In his article, Dubljevi? (2013) promotes a political concept of autonomy that is supposedly devoid of metaphysical assumptions concerning free will, yet still allows us to ascribe moral responsibility to agents.He is clear that autonomy embedded in the legal and political system need not presuppose libertarianism nor compatibilism and/or determinism. We argue that Dubljevi? overstates his case. Once the concept of political autonomy is carefully analyzed, it is clear that political autonomy relies on assuming free will. We may not need to assume agent causation, but we must at least assume a compatibilist notion of freedom. At best his argument would show the more commonly defended claim that political autonomy is consistent with compatibilism. First, we highlight how Dubljevi?'s concept of political autonomy is dependent on compatibilist assumptions. Next, we show that neither John Rawls nor Adina Roskies, the two authors Dubljevi? cites to bolster his position, make Dubljevi?'s account any more plausible