SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES

von Mouche Pierre; Yamazaki Takeshi

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SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES

机译：集合游戏平衡唯一性的充要条件

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摘要

Sufficient and necessary conditions for an aggregative game to have a unique Nash equilibrium are identified. In particular, an improvement of a result of Gaudet and Salant (1991) for Cournot oligopolies is obtained. The results are proved by exploiting the general relation between Nash equilibria and fixed points of the (virtual) aggregate cumulative best reply correspondence.

机译：确定了使总体博弈具有唯一的纳什均衡的充分必要条件。特别是，获得了Gaudet和Salant（1991）对古诺寡头的研究结果的改进。通过利用Nash均衡与（虚拟）集合累积最佳答复对应关系的固定点之间的一般关系来证明结果。

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《Journal of nonlinear and convex analysis》 |2015年第2期|共12页
作者
von Mouche Pierre; Yamazaki Takeshi;
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正文语种 eng
中图分类数学;
关键词
Cumulative best reply correspondence; aggregative game; Fisher-Hahn conditions; fixed point; Cournot oligopoly; pseudo-concavity; equilibrium (semi-)uniqueness;

机译：累积最佳答复对应;集合博弈;Fisher-Hahn条件;不动点;古诺寡头;伪凹性;平衡（半）唯一性;

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1. SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES [J] . von Mouche Pierre, Yamazaki Takeshi Journal of nonlinear and convex analysis . 2015,第2期

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2. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A UNIQUE AND STABLE EQUILIBRIUM STATE OF AN ADIABATIC TUBULAR REACTOR WITH RECYCLE [J] . HISAYOSHI MATSUYAMA Journal of Chemical Engineering of Japan . 1970,第2期

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SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES

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