We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insur-ance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what iscommonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is notallowed to enforce exclusivity of trades (third best inefficiency). Our setting is the same asthat of Bisin and Guaitoli [Bisin, A., Guaitoli, D., 2004. Moral hazard with nonexclusive con-tracts. Rand Journal of Economics 2, 306-328]. We hence argue that some of the equilibriumconditions they imposed are not necessary, and we exhibit a set of equilibrium allocationswhich fail to satisfy them.
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机译：我们研究了一种经济，在这种经济中，中介人在受道德风险影响的非排他性保险市场中竞争合同。在这种情况下，我们表明，与通常认为的相反，即使计划者不允许执行交易的排他性（第三低效率），市场均衡也可能无法有效。我们的设置与Bisin和Guaitoli的设置相同[Bisin，A.，Guaitoli，D.，2004。具有非排他性合同的道德风险。 Rand Journal of Economics 2，306-328]。因此，我们认为它们施加的某些均衡条件不是必需的，并且我们展示了一组不能满足它们的均衡分配。
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