首页> 外文期刊>Journal of health politics, policy and law >Compensation for medical injury in New Zealand: does ''no-fault' increase the level of claims making and reduce social and clinical selectivity?
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Compensation for medical injury in New Zealand: does ''no-fault' increase the level of claims making and reduce social and clinical selectivity?

机译:新西兰的医疗伤害赔偿:“无过失”是否会提高理赔水平并降低社会和临床选择性?

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摘要

The issues of patient safety and quality of care have gained policy attention with a growing appreciation of the scale and impact of medical injury in health systems. While the focus is clearly on the prevention of iatrogenic injury, the question of patient compensation is now also considered important, if only because in fault-based tort systems the fear of litigation may itself be a barrier to the disclosure and open discussion of medical error. No-fault systems, by contrast, do not require proof of culpability, and thus may both reduce barriers to compensation and increase disclosure of error. Little evidence, however, is available on the performance of such systems. This article reports on the analysis of two data sources-a sample of hospital admissions and a complete set of compensation claims for medical injury. Both are for the same year and region of New Zealand, a country that has maintained a no-fault system of accident compensation for a quarter of a century. Just over 2 percent of hospital admissions were associated with an adverse event that was potentially compensable under scheme criteria. While the claims process was well targeted, the level of claims making and receipt was low, with the ratio of successful claims to potentially compensable events being approximately 1:30. Comparison of social and clinical characteristics of the two data sets revealed a degree of selectivity. Compared with the hospital events, the typical successful claimant was younger and female and was much more likely to have experienced a surgical adverse event that, while unexpected, was not due to substandard care. It is concluded that, in interpreting these results, account needs to be taken of a number of features unique to the New Zealand system. These include: the limited payoff for a compensation claim (no pain and suffering or lump sum, free hospital care); the relative complexity of the grounds for claim (either rarity and severity or practitioner error); and a history of limited litigation for medical error. This suggests that, while the New Zealand system is well targeted, cheap, and free of financial and legal barriers, a change in legal doctrine alone has not in itself been sufficient to remove completely the selective and low level of claims making traditionally associated with patient compensation under tort.
机译:随着对医疗系统中医疗伤害的规模和影响的日益重视,患者安全和护理质量问题已引起政策关注。尽管重点显然放在预防医源性伤害上,但现在也认为患者赔偿问题很重要,只要仅仅是因为在基于过错的侵权系统中,对诉讼的恐惧本身可能成为医疗错误披露和公开讨论的障碍。 。相比之下,无故障系统不需要可证明的罪行,因此可以减少补偿的障碍并增加错误的披露。但是,很少有证据表明此类系统的性能。本文报告了对两个数据源的分析,这两个数据源是入院样本和完整的医疗伤害赔偿要求。两者都是针对同一年和新西兰地区的,新西兰在25年的时间里一直保持着无故障事故赔偿制度。略高于2%的医院入院率是与不良事件相关的,根据计划标准,该事件可能可予赔偿。尽管索赔过程的针对性很强,但是索赔的产生和接收的水平很低,成功索赔与潜在可赔事件的比率约为1:30。两种数据集的社会和临床特征比较显示出一定程度的选择性。与医院事件相比,典型的成功申领者是年轻和女性,而且发生外科手术不良事件的可能性更大,尽管这是出乎意料的,而不是由于护理水平不高所致。结论是,在解释这些结果时,需要考虑到新西兰系统独有的许多功能。其中包括:赔偿要求的有限回报(无痛苦,一次性或一次性,免费住院治疗);索赔理由的相对复杂性(稀有性和严重性或从业者错误);以及因医疗错误提起的有限诉讼历史。这表明,尽管新西兰系统的针对性强,价格便宜且没有财务和法律障碍,但仅改变法律原则本身并不足以完全消除传统上与患者有关的选择性和低水平的索赔要求侵权赔偿。

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