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Un-thought out metaphysics in analyticalpsychology: a critique of Jung'sepistemological basis for psychic reality

机译:分析心理学中未经深思的形而上学:对荣格的心理学现实认识论基础的批判

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The author investigates the relation of Kant, Schopenhauer and Heidegger to Jung's attempts to formulate theory regarding the epistemological conundrum of what can and what cannot be known and what must remain uncertain. Jung's ambivalent use and misuse of Kant's division of the world into phenomenal and noumenal realms is highlighted in discussion of concepts such as the psychoid archetype which he called 'esse in anima' and his use of Schopenhauer's concept of 'will' to justify a transcendence of the psyche/soma divide in a postulation of a `psychoid' realm. Finally, the author describes Jung's reaction to Heidegger's theories via his assertion that Heidegger's 'pre-given world design' was an alternate formulation of his concept of the archetypes. An underlying theme of the paper is a critique of Jung's foundationalism which perpetuates the myth of an isolated mind. This model of understanding subjectivity is briefly contrasted with Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' which focuses on a non-Cartesian 'understanding' of the `presenting of being' in everyday social and historical contexts.
机译:作者研究了康德,叔本华和海德格尔与荣格试图建立有关认识论难题的理论的尝试的关系,认识论难题包括什么可以知道,什么不知道,什么必须保持不确定。荣格对康德将世界划分为现象世界和本体世界的模棱两可的使用和滥用,在对诸如他被称为“生命中的灵魂”的类心理原型以及他对叔本华的“意志”概念的证明中得到了证明。心理/躯体在“拟态”领域的假设中分裂。最后,作者通过断言海德格尔的“预先给定的世界设计”是他的原型概念的替代表达,描述了荣格​​对海德格尔理论的反应。本文的一个基本主题是对荣格的基础主义的批判,这使孤立思想的神话永存。这种理解主观性的模型与海德格尔的“基本本体论”作了简要的对比,后者侧重于在日常的社会和历史环境中对非存在的“存在”进行非笛卡尔的“理解”。

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