首页> 外文期刊>Chemical Weekly >M&As may reduce mid-size pharma companies'market share

【24h】

M&As may reduce mid-size pharma companies'market share

机译：并购可能会降低中型制药公司的市场份额

获取原文

获取原文并翻译 | 示例

掌桥外文数据库（机构版） >>

开具论文收录证明 >>

页面导航

著录项
相似文献
相关主题

著录项

来源
《Chemical Weekly》 |2001年第29期|共1页
作者
Chemical Weekly Group;
展开▼
作者单位

展开▼
收录信息
原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类化学工业;
关键词

相似文献

外文文献
中文文献
专利

1. M&As may reduce mid-size pharma companies'market share [J] . Chemical Weekly Group Chemical Weekly . 2001,第29期

机译：并购可能会降低中型制药公司的市场份额
2. Next wave of chemical M&A to see mid-size companies buy corporate carve-outs - banker [J] . Joseph Chang ICIS News . 2019,第Octa17期

机译：下一波化学和A看中型公司购买企业雕刻 - 银行家
3. An Analysis of Accounting Variables and its impact on Market price per Share: Evidence from Nifty Pharma Index Companies of India [J] . Girish. S, Kavitha Desai Asian Journal of Management . 2018,第1PTa333a572期

机译：会计变量及其对每股市场价格的影响分析：来自印度Nifty Pharma指数公司的证据
4. Background of management and efficiency of internal capital markets--empirical from Chinese A-Shares listed companies [C] . Sheng Ran Fan, Zhi Bin Chen International Conference on Frontier of Energy and Environment Engineering . 2015

机译：内部资本市场的管理与效率 - 中国A股上市公司的经验
5. How to Build Trust in Market Research Relationships: A Case Study of a Mid-Size Market Research Company in China. [D] . Tang, Huiting. 2014

机译：如何在市场研究关系中建立信任：以中国一家中型市场研究公司为例。
6. Company accused of exploiting unique features of drug to retain market share [O] . Zosia Kmietowicz 2008

机译：公司被指控利用药物的独特功能来保持市场份额
7. Pyramidal groups, in Italy and elsewhere, represent a model of separation of ownership and control. Pyramids typically have blockholders which extract private benefits of control at the expenses of minority shareholder. This paper focuses on the Italian case where the number of pyramids is reducing but are still largely diffused. Groups are a form of entrenchment and may have negative effects on firm growth. They are characterized by conflicts of interest and self-dealing practices which reduced external financing opportunities. In this paper legal regulation of groups in Italy is discussed, which has positive aspects (art. 2497 ss. c.c.) but some weaknesses on self-dealing practices (artt. 2391 and 2391-bis c.c.). Future reforms should take into consideration the guidelines given at European level (for instance, by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts and the European Commission), which have been set aside from the political agendas of mostly European governments. Moreover, we suggest to strengthen the process of (not only formal) disclosure of relevant information to the company shareholders’ as well, in order not to dismantle pyramids, but to make them “shorter” (when that is the case), more transparent and reciprocally competitive. [O] . Giacomo Bosi, Sandro Trento 100

机译：在意大利和其他地方的金字塔群体代表了所有权和控制权分离的模式。金字塔通常拥有大股东，以小股东的利益为代价提取控制权的私人利益。本文重点关注意大利案例，其中金字塔的数量在减少，但仍然在很大程度上分散。群体是一种壕沟形式，可能对企业的成长产生负面影响。它们的特点是利益冲突和自我交易做法，减少了外部融资机会。在本文中，讨论了意大利群体的法律规定，它具有积极的方面（第2497条，c.c。），但在自我交易实践方面存在一些弱点（第2391条和第2391条之二）。未来的改革应该考虑到欧洲层面的指导方针（例如，公司法专家和欧洲委员会的高级别小组），这些指导方针已被搁置在主要是欧洲政府的政治议程之外。此外，我们建议加强（不仅正式）向公司股东披露相关信息的过程，以便不拆除金字塔，而是使它们“更短”（在这种情况下），更透明并且相互竞争。

获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

客服微信
服务号