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The Demolition Exercise in the Cartesian Methodic Doubt and Husserlean Phenomenological Epoche: A Metaphysical Interpretation

机译:笛卡尔有条不紊的怀疑与胡塞尔的现象学时代的拆除运动:形而上学的解释

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The search for knowledge that is true and certain has been fervent from time immemorial. Since it is the nature of man to know, to cogitate and to understand, it becomes imperative to set out the conditions under which one can properly say that this is the foundation of knowledge, this is the route to knowledge, this is knowledge per se, and this is how we `ought’ to benefit from knowledge. This paper therefore seeks to periscope knowledge in the light of Descartes methodic Doubt and Husserl`s phenomenological Epoche. It is important to point out that both Descartes and Husserl were involved in a demolition exercise of previously acquired knowledge in order to establish a firm foundation for certain true, indubitable knowledge. I shall expose their views and hermeneutically subject them to serious metaphysical lashing in the light of a better interpretation of human cognition comprehended within a metaphysical frame-work. It is pertinent to observe that the problem of skepticism arises from the method of science and not from the structure of reality. For knowledge to be knowledge in strictu sensu, it must be in line with the structure of reality and its ultimate support.
机译:从远古时代开始,人们就一直在寻求真实而又确定的知识。既然认识,交往和理解是人的天性,那么就必须设定一个条件,在此条件下,人们可以正确地说这是知识的基础,这是通往知识的途径,这就是知识本身,这就是我们应该从知识中受益的方式。因此,本文根据笛卡尔方法论的怀疑和胡塞尔的现象学方法论来寻求潜望镜知识。重要的是要指出,笛卡尔和胡塞尔都参与了对先前获得的知识的拆除工作,以便为某些真正的,不可逾越的知识建立牢固的基础。我将阐明他们的观点,并根据对形而上学框架中所包含的人类认知的更好解释,对它们进行诠释学上的严厉抨击。有必要观察到,怀疑主义问题源于科学方法,而不是现实结构。为了使知识成为严格意义上的知识,它必须符合现实的结构及其最终支持。

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