首页> 外文期刊>Open Journal of Philosophy >Three Levels of Cognition: Particulars, Universals, and Representals
【24h】

Three Levels of Cognition: Particulars, Universals, and Representals

机译:认知的三个层次:特殊性,普遍性和代表性

获取原文
       

摘要

It is shown that apart from the two well known levels of cognition involving the epistemological concepts particulars and universals, there is an intermediate level of cognition necessitating a new epistemological concept which we call represental. This has become necessary as a result of emergence of statistics (an empirical science), the theory of probability (a branch of pure mathematics), and quantum mechanics (as a branch of physics) at the beginning of the nineteenth century. We attribute to a particular man (like Mr. Jones) well defined properties (like a definite number of children) whereas we attribute to a man, the universal, only some general properties (like having an erect body). Thus particulars and universals involve two levels of cognition. In statistics we deal with the properties of a large number of particulars denoted by a universal, without referring to such details as which particular has which properties. Thus statistics involves a new level of cognition. In statistics, we attribute all the statistical properties to a single entity and refer to it as the represental (entity); the concept of represental man is only a generalization of the concept of average man proposed by Quetelet in 1869. These three epistemological concepts are distinguished by the relation they bear with respect to the possible “states” of the particulars. For instance, Mr. Jones, a particular man, can be in the state of having either 0, or 1, or 2, … children only; a man, the universal, cannot be said to have either 0, or 1, or 2, … children, though the state of having children is relevant to him (but not to a chair, the universal); the represental man has 0 child with probability P(0), 1 child with probability P(1), 2 children with probability P(2), …Thus the possible states are mutually exclusive in particulars, are only relevant to the universal, and coexist in the represental with respective probabilities. By recognizing that in statistics, the theory of probability, and quantum mechanics we deal with a new level of cognition involving the epistemological concept of represental, the interpretational problems of statistical phenomena are resolved.
机译:结果表明,除了认识论概念的特殊性和普遍性这两个众所周知的认知水平外,还有一个中等的认知水平,这就需要一个新的认识论概念,我们称之为代表性。由于19世纪初的统计学(经验科学),概率论(纯数学的一个分支)和量子力学(作为物理学的一个分支)的出现,这已成为必要。我们归因于一个特定的人(如琼斯先生)定义明确的属性(如一定数量的孩子),而我们归因于一个人,即通用的,只有一些常规属性(如具有直立的身体)。因此,细节和普遍性涉及两个层次的认知。在统计中,我们处理由通用表示的大量特征的属性,而不涉及诸如哪个特征具有哪个属性之类的细节。因此,统计涉及到新的认知水平。在统计中,我们将所有统计属性都归于一个实体,并将其称为表示(实体);代表性人的概念只是Quetelet在1869年提出的普通人概念的概括。这三个认识论概念的区别在于它们与细节的可能“状态”之间的关系。例如,一个特殊的人琼斯先生可能处于生有0个或1个或2个……孩子的状态;一个普遍的人不能说有0个,1个或2个……孩子,尽管有孩子的状态与他有关(但与椅子无关)。有代表性的人有0个孩子的概率为P(0),1个孩子的概率为P(1),2个孩子的概率为P(2),……因此,可能的状态在细节上是互斥的,仅与普遍性有关,并且与相应的概率共存于表示中。通过认识到统计学,概率论和量子力学,我们处理了涉及表征的认识论概念的新水平的认知,从而解决了统计现象的解释问题。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号