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ON THE COAST THEOREM AND COALITIONAL STABILITY: THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RELATIVE CONCESSION

机译:海岸定理和整体稳定性:等值相对让步的原理

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摘要

The Coase theorem is argued to be incompatible with bargaining set stability due to a tension between the grand coalition and sub-coalitions. We provide a counter-intuitive argument to demonstrate that the Coase theorem may be in complete consonance with bargaining set stability. We establish that an uncertainty concerning the formation of sub-coalitions will explain such com- patibility: each agent fears that others may 'gang up' against him and this fear forces the agents to negotiate.
机译:科斯定理因大联盟与次联盟之间的紧张关系而被认为与谈判集的稳定性不相容。我们提供了违反直觉的论点,以证明科斯定理可能与讨价还价集的稳定性完全一致。我们确定,关于子联盟形成的不确定性将解释这种兼容性:每个代理人担心其他人可能“联合起来”反对他,并且这种担心迫使代理人进行谈判。

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