Technology as Moral Agent

摘要

In his new book Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things (2011), Peter-Paul Verbeek discusses the implications for the ethics of technology of the mediation theory that he developed in his previous book What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design (2005). His approach is not only original but also rich and multi-faceted, seemingly easily moving from abstract philosophical discussions about Heidegger and Foucault to the practice of engineering design and the development of ambient intelligence and persuasive technology. Part of the value of the book lays no doubt in this combination of philosophical argument and analysis of concrete technological developments. The book also has important practical implications for the design and development of new technologies, augmenting current approaches in engineering ethics and science and technology studies. At the core of the book, however, is a philosophical argument about how current ethical theory should be adapted to do justice to the moral significance of technologies. It is this argument I will be focusing on. There is a slight danger in this focus because it is likely to stress the points in which I disagree with Verbeek rather than the points at which I agree with him. Let me therefore at the outset stress that I agree that technological mediation is an interesting and important phenomenon that requires more attention in the ethics of technology. I also largely agree with the practical implications that Verbeek sketches for the design and use of technologies. In addition, I liked his Foucauldian treatment of freedom. What I doubt, however, is whether all these things require the kind of drastic changes in ethical theory that Verbeek proposes. Surely, ethicists have tended to ignore the role of technologies in morality and ethics, and surely doing justice to their moral significance may require certain changes in ethical theory, but I am not sure whether a redefinition of moral agency is the right target for such changes. But rather than getting ahead of my argument, I should start with explaining why Verbeek thinks that doing justice to the moral significance of technology requires a new approach to ethics.