首页> 外文期刊>Oxford Economic Papers >Foreign aid as counterterrorism policy
【24h】

Foreign aid as counterterrorism policy

机译:外援作为反恐政策

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

This paper presents a model where foreign aid bolsters a developing country’s proactive counterterrorism efforts against a resident transnational terrorist group. In stage 1 of the game, the donor country allocates resources to terrorism-fighting tied aid, general assistance, and defensive actions at home. The recipient country then decides its proactive campaign against the common terrorist threat in stage 2, while the terrorists direct their attacks against the donor and recipient countries in stage 3. Terrorists’ choices in the final stage provide a solid microfoundation for the terrorists’ likelihood of success function. In stage 2, greater tied aid raises the recipient country’s proactive measures and regime instability, while increased general aid reduces these proactive efforts and regime instability. In stage 1, a donor’s homeland security decisions are interdependent with its aid package to a recipient country, hosting resident transnational terrorists. This interdependency and its implications have gone unrecognized to date.
机译:本文提出了一个模型,其中外国援助可以支持发展中国家对居民跨国恐怖组织的积极反恐努力。在游戏的第一阶段,捐助国将资源分配给与恐怖主义相关的捆绑援助,一般援助和本国的防御行动。然后,受援国在第2阶段决定针对共同的恐怖主义威胁采取积极的行动,而恐怖分子则在第3阶段将其袭击直接针对捐助国和受援国。在最后阶段,恐怖分子的选择为恐怖分子的恐怖活动提供了坚实的基础。成功功能。在第2阶段,更多的有附加条件的援助会增加受援国的主动措施和政权不稳定,而增加的一般援助会减少这些主动努力和政权的不稳定。在第1阶段,捐助者的国土安全决定与其向受援国提供的援助方案相互依存,该收容国收容了跨国恐怖分子。迄今为止,这种相互依存及其影响尚未得到认识。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Oxford Economic Papers》 |2011年第3期|p.423-447|共25页
  • 作者

    Javed Younas;

  • 作者单位
  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-18 01:06:24

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号