Decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty

摘要

To explore the equilibrium behavior of decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty (DSC-WCR-UDU or DSC for brevity's sake). In a centralized supply chain (CSC), all decisions are made by a single entity maximizing chain wide expected profits. In DSCs, important issues relate to determining who controls which decisions and in which ways the different chain members are compensated. A more significant issue is the specification of contractual arrangements between the parties that allows the DCS to perform as well as a CSC. Such contracts are referred to as perfect coordination mechanisms. These issues are explored in the paper in the context of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers with a general model. Each retailer faces random demand volume during a given sales season, the distribution of which may depend only on its own: 1. Retail price (noncompeting retailers: Case Ⅰ). 2. As well as those of the other retailers (competing retailers: Case Ⅱ) according to general stochastic demand functions. All retailers order a one time procurement from the supplier at the beginning of the season. The paper designs contractual arrangements between parties that allow DSC to perform as well as CSCs.