Coordinating a supply chain for deteriorating items with a revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract

摘要

In this study, a one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain model for deteriorating items with controllable deterioration rate and price-dependent demand is developed, in which both players cooperatively invest in preservation technology to reduce deterioration. Algorithms are designed to obtain the pricing and preservation technology investment strategies in both integrated and decentralized scenarios. It is shown that cooperative investment strategy benefits the manufacturer but damages the profits of the retailer and the whole supply chain. A revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract, which combines revenue sharing and cost sharing mechanisms, is thus designed to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium strategies and coordinating results on key system parameters are given to verify the effectiveness of the contract, and meanwhile get some managerial insights. The results show that only when the revenue sharing rate lies roughly between 1/2 and 3/4 can the contract perfectly coordinate the supply chain in most cases, which has an important guiding significance for the supply chain coordination of deteriorating items when considering preservation technology investment. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.