Modular HTR confinement/containment and the protection against aircraft crash

摘要

Does an HTR need a containment - pressure resistant - or is it possible - licensable - to have only a so-called confinement. The answer depends on both the results of the safety analysis of the accidents considered in the design and the acceptance by the licensing authorities and the public of a safety approach only based on severe core damage exclusion. The safety approach to be developed for modular HTRs must describe the application of the defence in depth principle for such reactors. Whatever the requirements on the last confinement barrier could be, a convincing demonstration of the exclusion of any severe core damage is needed, relying on exhaustive and bounding considerations of severe core damage initiators and the use of non-questionable arguments. The paper presents the containment issues for HTRs based on German experience background and considerations for modern modular HTR safety approach including beyond design situations. 1. For the German HTRs (designed in the 80s), it could be shown in the licensing procedures in Germany that there was no need for a pressure retaining and gas tight containment to enclose radioactive nuclides released from the nuclear heat source. Instead, the confinement envelope acted in conjunction with other barriers to minimize the release of radioactive nuclides and the radiological impact on the environment. 2. The confinement envelope consisted of the reactor building, a sub-atmospheric pressure system, a building pressure relief system, an HVAC systems isolation and a filtration system. 3. During a major depressurization accident, unfiltered releases were discharged to the environment. The analyses results show that the environmental impact was far below the dose limits according to the German Radiological Protection Ordinance, even when the effect of filters was not taken into account. 4. The demonstration strongly relied on the assumptions made for the source term definition, e.g. the fuel particles failure rates (under irradiation and during accidental conditions), the diffusion data, the dust data and the deposition/lift-off mechanisms. 5. For modern modular HTRs, the last confinement barrier performances will have to be determined in accordance with the set of accidents to be considered in the design including internal and external hazards and the limits targeted for the public and the environment protection. Further more the paper presents an analysis of effects of a deliberate crash of a large commercial airliner on a former German HTR design.