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The theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley

机译:稳定分配理论和市场设计实践。 Alvin E. Roth和Lloyd S. Shapley荣获2012年诺贝尔经济学奖

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摘要

The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012 was awarded jointly to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley for their contributions to the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The theory of stable allocations consists of a family of models that study assignment problems in which two disjoint sets of agents (or a set of agents and a set of objects) have to be matched. For example, men to women, workers to firms, students to schools, or patients to live donor kidneys. A matching is stable if no subset of agents can improved upon their proposed matches by rematching only among themselves. Stability is an essential property if matching is voluntary. The practice of market design consists of applying those two-sided matching models to specific assignment problems with the aim of proposing improvements on how they are solved. This paper presents a brief description of the academic career of the laureates and describes their contributions by presenting the most basic two-sided matching model and some of its market design applications, including the organization of a centralized system to propose kidney transplantations to use kidneys of live donors that are incompatible with their respective patients, the yearly assignment of North-American medical students to hospital internship programs, and children to schools in cities such as Boston and New York.
机译:纪念阿尔弗雷德·诺贝尔的2012年Sveriges银行经济科学奖由阿尔文·E·罗斯和劳埃德·S·沙普利共同颁发,以表彰他们对稳定分配理论和市场设计实践的贡献。稳定分配的理论由研究分配问题的一系列模型组成,其中两个不相交的代理集(或一组代理和一组对象)必须匹配。例如,男人到女人,工人到公司,学生到学校,或患者到供体肾脏。如果没有代理商子集可以通过仅在他们之间重新匹配来改善他们建议的匹配,则匹配是稳定的。如果匹配是自愿的,则稳定性是必不可少的属性。市场设计的实践包括将那些双向匹配模型应用于特定的分配问题,以提出改进解决方案的目的。本文通过介绍最基本的两面匹配模型及其一些市场设计应用,简要介绍了获奖者的学术生涯,并描述了他们的贡献,包括组织了一个中心系统来建议使用肾脏移植的肾脏移植。与各自患者不相容的活体捐献者,每年派北美医学生参加医院实习计划,以及将孩子们送往波士顿和纽约等城市的学校。

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  • 来源
    《Contributions to science》 |2015年第1期|103-112|共10页
  • 作者

    Jordi Masso;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Economy and of History of Economy, Autonomous University of Barcelona,Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona, Catalonia,Dept. d'Economia i d'Historia Economica Facultat d'Economia i Empresa Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona 08193 Bellaterra, Catalonia;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    game theory; market design; stable allocations; mathematical economics; kidney transplantation;

    机译:博弈论市场设计;稳定的分配;数学经济学;肾脏移植;
  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 13:07:16

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