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Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers

机译:具有前瞻性消费者的季节性产品最优定价

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We study the optimal pricing of a finite quantity of a fashion-like seasonal good in the presence of forward-looking (strategic) customers. We distinguish between two classes of pricing strategies: contingent and announced fixed-discount. In both cases, the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader announcing his pricing strategy, while consumers act as followers taking the seller's strategy as given and determining their purchasing behavior. In each case, we identify a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and show that given the seller's strategy, the equilibrium in the consumer subgame is unique and consists of symmetric threshold purchasing policies. For both cases, we develop a benchmark model in which customers are nonstrategic (myopic). We conduct a comprehensive numerical study to explore the impact of strategic consumer behavior on pricing policies and expected revenue performance. We show that strategic customer behavior suppresses the benefits of price segmentation, particularly under medium-to-high values of heterogeneity and modest rates of decline in valuations. However, when the level of consumer heterogeneity is small, the rate of decline is medium-to-high, and the seller can optimally choose the time of discount in advance, segmentation can be used quite effectively even with strategic consumers. We find that the seller cannot avoid the adverse impact of strategic consumer behavior even under low levels of initial inventory. We argue that while the seller expects customers to be more concerned about product availability at discount time, he cannot use high-price "betting" strategies as he would in the case of low inventory and myopic customers. Under certain qualifications, announced fixed-discount strategies perform essentially the same as contingent pricing policies in the case of myopic consumers. However, under strategic consumer behavior, announced pricing policies can be advantageous to the seller, compared to contingent pricing schemes. Interestingly, those cases that announced discount strategies offer a significant advantage compared to contingent pricing policies. They appear to offer only a minimal advantage in comparison to fixed-pricing policies. Finally, when the seller incorrectly assumes that strategic customers are myopic in their purchasing decisions, it can be quite costly, reaching potential revenue losses of about 20%.
机译:我们研究存在前瞻性(战略)客户的情况下,有限数量的类似时尚的季节性商品的最优定价。我们区分两类定价策略:或有和宣布的固定折扣。在这两种情况下,卖方都是Stackelberg负责人,宣布其定价策略,而消费者则作为追随者,按照卖方给出的策略确定购买行为。在每种情况下,我们都确定了一个子博弈完美的纳什均衡,并表明在给定卖方策略的情况下,消费者子博弈中的均衡是唯一的,并且由对称阈值购买策略组成。对于这两种情况,我们都开发了一个基准模型,在该模型中,客户是非策略性(近视)的。我们进行了全面的数值研究,以探讨战略性消费者行为对定价政策和预期收入表现的影响。我们表明,战略性客户行为抑制了价格细分的好处,尤其是在中等到高的异构值和适度的估值下降率下。但是,当消费者异质性水平较小,下降速度为中到高水平时,卖方可以预先选择最优的折扣时间,即使对于战略性消费者也可以非常有效地使用细分。我们发现,即使在初始库存水平较低的情况下,卖方也无法避免战略性消费者行为的不利影响。我们认为,尽管卖方希望客户在打折时更加关注产品的可用性,但他不能像在低库存和近视客户的情况下那样使用高价格的“下注”策略。在某些条件下,就近视消费者而言,已宣布的固定折扣策略与或有定价策略的性能基本相同。但是,在有策略性的消费者行为下,与或有定价机制相比,宣布的定价政策可能对卖方有利。有趣的是,与或有定价策略相比,那些宣布了折扣策略的案例具有明显的优势。与固定定价策略相比,它们似乎只提供了最小的优势。最后,当卖方错误地认为战略客户在他们的购买决定中是近视时,这可能会非常昂贵,可能会导致大约20%的收入损失。

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