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Choice of Electronic Waste Recycling Standard Under Recovery Channel Competition

机译:回收渠道竞争下电子废物回收标准的选择

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Problem definition: We consider two competing electronic waste (e-waste) recovery channels, each of which consists of a collector and a recycler. Collectors obtain donated e-waste and sell the collected items to recyders or in the secondary market, whereas recyclers process e-waste and sell the recycled material in the commodity market. Each recycler chooses for certification of one of two standards: e-Stewards or Responsible Recycling (R2). E-Stewards requires comparably more responsible handling, thus a higher processing cost, but attracts more e-waste from environmentally conscious donors. Academidpractical relevance: Despite the rapid growth of e-waste, the operations management community still understands little about e-waste processing supply chains. We add to this body of knowledge by capturing three salient features in the e-waste recovery industry: the existence of two recycling standards, the secondary market, and competition both within and between recovery channels. Methodology: We model the problem as a Stackelberg game and characterize the firms' equilibrium decisions, deriving managerial insights through sensitivity analysis and numerical studies. Results: Competition between recovery channels is a key factor motivating e-Stewards adoption, whereas a recyder always chooses R2 in its absence. Interestingly, when competition exists both within and between recovery channels, recyclers with strong e-waste processing scale economies choose e-Stewards when incurring significantly higher processing costs than with R2. Furthermore, both the total environmental benefit and welfare might be higher when recyclers choose R2. Managerial implications: Policy makers who aim to encourage e-Stewards adoption should (1) lower entry barriers for new recyclers to induce competition, and (2) offer incentive programs to alleviate e-Stewards' cost disadvantage, though only when recyclers have weak scale economies. Policy makers and nongovernmental organizations, however, should exercise caution in endorsing e-Stewards because R2 actually may generate a higher environmental benefit because of higher recycling volumes.
机译:问题定义:我们考虑了两个竞争的电子废物(电子废物)回收渠道,每个渠道都由一个收集者和一个回收者组成。收集者获得捐赠的电子废物并将收集的物品出售给回收商或在二级市场,而回收商则处理电子废物并在商品市场出售回收的材料。每个回收商都选择以下两个标准之一进行认证:电子管家或负责任回收(R2)。电子管家需要相对负责任的处理,因此处理成本更高,但吸引了更多具有环保意识的捐助者。学术上的实用性:尽管电子废物迅速增长,但运营管理界对电子废物处理供应链仍然知之甚少。通过捕获电子废物回收行业的三个显着特征,我们增加了这方面的知识:两个回收标准的存在,二级市场以及回收渠道之内和之间的竞争。方法:我们将问题建模为Stackelberg博弈,并刻画公司的均衡决策,并通过敏感性分析和数值研究得出管理见解。结果:恢复渠道之间的竞争是促使采用e-Stewards的关键因素,而回收者总是在没有R2的情况下选择R2。有趣的是,当回收渠道之内和之间存在竞争时,电子废物处理规模经济性强的回收商选择的电子废物处理成本要比R2高得多。此外,当回收商选择R2时,总的环境效益和福利可能更高。对管理的影响:旨在鼓励采用e-Stewards的政策制定者应(1)降低新回收商的入口壁垒以诱导竞争,以及(2)提供激励计划以减轻e-Stewards的成本劣势,尽管仅当回收商规模较小时经济。但是,决策者和非政府组织在批准e-Stewards时应谨慎行事,因为R2实际上可能由于回收量更高而产生更高的环境效益。

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