ANALYZING THE EFFICIENCY OF PENSION REFORM: THE ROLE OF THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF FISCAL CLOSURES

摘要

Replacing the pay-as-you-go defined benefit (PAYG DB) system with an at least partially funded defined contribution (DC) system generates fiscal costs that need financing. The fiscal closures at hand differ by the channel and the extent of distortions. The main contribution of this paper is a thorough comparison of the welfare effects of the various fiscal closures of the pension system reform. In addition, we decompose the welfare effects to the parts attributable to changing the way pensions are financed (PAYG double right arrow prefunding) and to changing the way pensions are computed (DB double right arrow DC). We show that depending on the fiscal closure, the welfare effects differ substantially for the same pension system reform. The financing of the the pension system gap with public debt allows more intergenerational redistribution.