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Research on Marketing Channel Multi-principal - Agent Based on Reciprocal Fairness Preference Theory

机译:基于对等公平偏好理论的营销渠道多主体-Agent研究

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摘要

The manufacturers and retailers in marketing channels are often asymmetric information. In this paper, Channel consists of two components-manufacturers and a retailer with the market "zero distance" retailers have more than the manufacturer's information. Based on this, the first multi-principal - agent model had structured based on marketing channels practice, the results show that: retailers' marketing efforts for a product is correlation related to the incentives coefficient given by manufacturers, and negative related to the incentives coefficient given by the other manufacturers, and correlation related to profit per unit of the product, and negative related to profit per unit of other product. Further, fair preference theory will embedded in channel research of incentive, the results show that: under certain conditions, after the introduction of fairness preference, incentive coefficient is not less than non-fairness preference, is of great importance to the greater equity preference and the greater degree of their motivation. When the manufacturer also has a fair preference, the retailer's optimal utility the same, but not less than the manufacturer's utility when the utility of non-fairness preference, the utility of the manufacturer with a fair preference bias coefficient increases. Finally, future research also raised in the paper.
机译:营销渠道中的制造商和零售商通常是不对称的信息。在本文中,渠道由两个部分组成:制造商和零售商,而市场“零距离”零售商所拥有的不仅仅是制造商的信息。在此基础上,基于营销渠道实践构建了第一个多主体-代理模型,结果表明:零售商对产品的营销努力与制造商给出的激励系数相关,而与激励系数负相关。由其他制造商给出的,与产品每单位利润的相关性,与其他产品每单位利润的相关性为负。进一步,公平偏好理论将被嵌入到激励渠道研究中,结果表明:在一定条件下,引入公平偏好后,激励系数不小于非公平偏好,对于更大的股权偏好具有重要意义。他们的动机更大。当制造商也具有公平偏好时,零售商的最优效用不变,但不小于制造商的效用时非公平偏好的效用,具有公平偏好偏差系数的制造商的效用增加。最后,本文还提出了进一步的研究。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Journal of Systems Science and Information》 |2011年第3期|p.259-276|共18页
  • 作者单位

    Research Institute of Operation and Decision, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610074, China;

    Research Institute of Operation and Decision, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610074, China;

    Research Institute of Operation and Decision, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610074, China;

    Research Institute of Operation and Decision, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610074, China;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    marketing channel; fairness preference; multi-principal; agent; incentive;

    机译:营销渠道;公平偏好;多主体激励;

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