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Which moral hazard? Health care reform under the Affordable Care Act of 2010

机译:哪个道德风险?根据2010年《平价医疗法案》进行的医疗改革

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Purpose - Moral hazard is a concept that is central to risk and insurance management. It refers to change in economic behavior when individuals are protected or insured against certain risks and losses whose costs are borne by another party. It asserts that the presence of an insurance contract increases the probability of a claim and the size of a claim. Through the US Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, this study seeks to examine the validity and relevance of moral hazard in health care reform and determine how welfare losses or inefficiencies could be mitigated. Design/methodology/approach - This study is divided into three sections. The first contrasts conventional moral hazard from an emerging or alternative theory. The second analyzes moral hazard in terms of the evolution, organization, management, and marketing of health insurance in the USA. The third explains why and how salient reform measures under the ACA might induce health care consumption and production in ways that could either promote or restrict personal health and safety as well as social welfare maximization. Findings - Insurance generally induces health care (over) consumption. However, not every additional consumption, with or without adverse selection, can be considered wasteful or risky, even if it might cost insurers more in the short run. Moral hazard can generate welfare and equity gains. These gains might vary depending on which ACA provisions, insured population, covered illnesses, treatments, and services, as well as health outcomes are taken into account, and because of the relative ambiguities surrounding definitions of "health." Actuarial risk models can nonetheless benefit from incorporating welfare and equity gains into their basic assumptions and estimations. Originality/value - This is the first study which examines the ACA in the context of the new or alternative theory of moral hazard It suggests that containing inefficient moral hazard and encouraging its desirable counterpart, are prime challenges in any health care reform initiative, especially as it adapts to the changing demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the insured population and regulatory landscape of health insurance in the USA.
机译:目的-道德风险是风险和保险管理的核心概念。它指的是当个人受到保护或购买保险以抵御某些风险和损失,而这些费用由另一方承担时,经济行为的变化。它断言,保险合同的存在增加了索赔的可能性和索赔的规模。通过2010年美国可负担医疗法案(ACA),本研究旨在研究医疗改革中道德风险的有效性和相关性,并确定如何减轻福利损失或低效率。设计/方法/方法-这项研究分为三个部分。第一个对比来自新兴理论或替代理论的常规道德风险。第二部分从美国健康保险的发展,组织,管理和营销方面分析了道德风险。第三部分解释了为什么以及如何在ACA下进行显着的改革措施可能以促进或限制个人健康与安全以及实现社会福利最大化的方式来引发医疗保健的消费和生产。调查结果-保险通常会导致医疗保健(过度)消费。但是,即使在短期内可能会使保险公司承担更多的费用,也不能将每笔额外的消费(无论是否选择不利的选择)都视为浪费或有风险的。道德风险可以产生福利和资产收益。这些收益可能会有所不同,具体取决于考虑到哪些ACA规定,参保人口,承保的疾病,治疗和服务以及健康结果,以及围绕“健康”定义的相对歧义。尽管如此,精算风险模型仍可以通过将福利和权益收益纳入其基本假设和估计中而受益。原创性/价值-这是首次在新的或替代的道德风险理论背景下研究ACA的研究。该研究表明,遏制低效的道德风险并鼓励其应对措施是任何医疗改革举措的主要挑战,尤其是在它适应了美国被保险人口不断变化的人口统计和社会经济特征以及健康保险的监管环境。

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