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An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets

机译:控制相关外部性的有效机制:再分配转移以及区域和全球污染许可市场的共存

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摘要

We examine joint tradable permit markets as a self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems. By "correlated" we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities (e.g. smog and global warming). By "self-enforcing" we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and international permit markets are Pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences.
机译:我们将可交易的联合许可市场作为一种自我控制的机制来控制相关的外部性问题。 “相关”是指多种污染物,它们是由单一来源共同产生的,但同时又引起不同的区域和全球外部性(例如,烟雾和全球变暖)。所谓“自我执行”,是指一种机制,该机制解释了在区域联盟内制定环境政策时竞争性管辖区之间存在的内生性。我们发现,国内和国际联合许可市场具有广泛的偏好,对帕累托有效。

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