The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice

摘要

Epstein, Landes, and Posner (hereafter, ELP) in this book provide "strictly a positive analysis" (p. 5) of the behavior of Federal judges-at the district, circuit, and Supreme Court levels. Their goal is to use data to transform the debate between realists and legalists. Legalists such as Judge Harry Edwards have emphasized that judges' decisions are constrained by the law, while realists emphasize the nonlegal (especially ideological) influences on judicial decision making (Edwards and Livermore 2009). ELP transcend the either-or nature of the debate by providing evidence that both types of decision making, legalistic and realist/ideological, exist to varying degrees at all three levels in the federal system. Specifically, they conclude that there is "less ideology in district-court decision-making than in that of either of the higher levels of the federal judiciary" (p. 11).